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This study assesses how globalization modulates the effect of governance on CO2 emissions 
in sub-Saharan African countries. The empirical evidence is based on Generalized Method of 
Moments.  The minimum level (or negative threshold) of FDI required for it to interact with 
political stability and contribute towards the green economy is 45% of GDP, while 90% of 
GDP is the maximum level (or positive threshold) required for trade to complement “voice & 
accountability” in mitigating CO2 emissions. 76 % of GDP and 80 % of GDP are respectively 
negative trade thresholds for government effectiveness and economic governance. The 
corresponding negative trade thresholds for the rule of law, corruption-control and 
institutional governance are respectively, 230% of GDP, 63.5% of GDP and 106.5% of GDP. 
Actionable openness policy thresholds are provided to inform policy makers on how 
governance interacts with globalization to promote the green economy.  
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How does globalization modulate the relevance of governance in carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)? This question which motivates the present research 
builds on four main features in the academic and policy literature, notably: (i) the 
contemporary policy syndrome of CO2 emissions in the light of Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs)1;   (ii) the importance of globalization in influencing domestic governance and 
by extension (iii) the relevance of domestic governance on macroeconomic outcomes such as 
environmental sustainability and (iv) shortcomings in the literature. These perspectives are 
substantiated in turn to elaborate detail. 
 First, consistent with recent literature, CO2 emissions are at an all time high 
(McGrath, 2018). This is very challenging in the light of the fact that reduction of 
environmental pollution is a central policy concern in the post-2015 development agenda or 
SDGs (Efobi, Tanankem, Orkoh, Atata, Akinyemi, & Beecroft, 2019; Asongu, le Roux & 
Biekpe, 2017). In accordance with McGrath (2018), CO2 emissions are increasing at a 
substantial rate because the overall green growth is not keeping even pace with the 
corresponding rise in CO2 emissions. According to the narrative, the CO2 emissions are 
driven by globalization and efforts at promoting the green economy are largely from domestic 
governments2. The relevance of globalization and political will are important for this research 
because the former is considered as a driving factor while the latter is used as a mechanism by 
which CO2 emissions can be reduced. These stylized factors are consistent with the problem 
statement of this research, notably: the role of globalization in the governance-“CO2 
emissions” nexus in SSA. The articulation of SSA is motivated by a stream of literature which 
supports the consensus that the consequences of global warming are most detrimental in the 
sub-region (Apkan & Apkan, 2012; Shurig, 2015; Kifle, 2008; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019a).  
 Second, in the light of the problem statement, it is reasonable to expect globalization 
to modulate governance for a multitude of reasons documented in the literature (Klitgaard, 
1988; Lalountas, Manolas & Vavouras, 2011; Asongu, Efobi & Tchamyou, 2018a). As 
substantiated in subsequent paragraphs of this section, there are strong linkages globalization 
                                                             
1 The notion of policy syndrome is multifaceted. While it is understood by Asongu (2017) to denote a gap in 
knowledge economy between two countries, the inclusive development literature has considered it as exclusive 
growth, notably: Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017a) and Tchamyou, Erreygers and Cassimon (2019). However, 
within the context of this study, environmental degradation or pollution in the perspective of CO2 emissions is 
considered as a policy syndrome.  
2 According to Asongu and Odhiambo (2021a), the green economy can be understood as an economy with the 
purpose of addressing concerns related to ecological scarcities and environmental risks with the ultimate aim to 
preserve the environment. 
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and CO2 emissions, with governance as a mechanism for the linkage. Accordingly, 
globalization has been documented to influence governance (Krueger, 1974; Bhagwati & 
Srinivasan, 1980; Bhagwati, 1982; Klitgaard, 1988; Gatti, 1999; Ades & Di Tella, 1999) and 
governance has also been established to affect CO2 emissions (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2021b). 
Hence, it is reasonable to expect globalization to modulate the incidence of governance on 
CO2 emissions.  
 Third,   building on the substantially documented relevance of good governance in 
development outcomes, there is a growing body of literature supporting the perspective that 
political will and good governance are important in tackling the issue of environmental 
pollution, especially in the light of SDGs. Some studies within this strand of literature 
include: Odhiambo (2009a, 2009b, 2010), Efobi et al. (2019), Asongu, le Roux and Biekpe 
(2018b), Jarrett (2017), Asongu (2018a), Akinyemi, Efobi, Asongu  and Osabuohien (2018),  
Anyangwe (2014), Akinyemi, Alege, Osabuohien and  Ogundipe (2015), Jones (2003), 
Hongwu (2013),  Afful-Koomson (2012),   Chemutai (2009) and  Odhiambo (2014a, 2014b). 
Unfortunately, the attendant literature has failed to assess the role of globalization in 
modulating the effect of governance on CO2 emissions. 
Fourth, two main streams characterize the body of literature on linkages between 
environmental degradation, energy consumption and other macroeconomic variables. The first 
stream embodies studies articulating connections between economic prosperity and 
environmental pollution whereas the second stream is concerned with the nexus between 
consumption of energy and economic development. Research in the second strand can be sub-
divided into two principal categories: (i) inquiries that are oriented towards bivariate linkages 
between energy use and economic development and (ii) research focusing on trivariate 
connections between the “use of energy”, economic development and environment pollution. 
Some examples of studies in the first category are: Jumbe (2004), Ang (2007),  Odhiambo 
(2009a, 2009b), Apergis and Payne (2009),  Menyah and Wolde-Rufael (2010), Begum, 
Sohag, Abdullah and  Jaafar  (2015),  Ozturk and Acaravci, (2010),   Bölük and Mehmet 
(2015) and   Begum et al., (2015). Some examples of research in the second category include: 
Mehrara (2007), Olusegun (2008), Akinlo (2008) and Esso (2010).  
 In the second strand of the literature, the concern of researchers pertains exclusively to 
testing the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis. The EKC hypothesis is a 
postulation that there is a non-linear nexus between environmental standards and income 
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levels in the long run. Some example of studies in this strand are:   He and Richard (2010), 
Diao, Zeng, Tam and Tam (2009) and Akbostanci, Turut-Asi  and Tunc  (2009).  
 The positioning of this study is closest to the second strand of the literature in the 
perspective that, it assesses the relevance of macroeconomic variables in environmental 
degradation. However, contrary to the underlying literature which is simply based on 
confirming or rejecting the EKC hypothesis, the innovations of this study are twofold. On the 
one hand, the research argues that it is not enough to establish linkages between two variables 
to confirm or reject the EKC. Accordingly, policy makers should be more interested in: (i) 
how policy instruments influence environmental degradation and (ii) by what mechanisms. 
This research incorporates the underlying critique by adopting globalization, governance and 
CO2 emissions respectively, as moderating instruments, policy channels and the policy 
syndrome of environmental degradation. On the other hand, it is also relevant for policy 
makers to be informed on specific policy thresholds at which the policy instruments interact 
with the mechanisms to influence the policy syndrome. To this end, this research also goes a 
step further by computing globalization policy thresholds at which governance either reduces 
or increases CO2 emissions. These policy thresholds are actionable measures that can be 
directly implemented by sampled countries in order to target specific outcomes pertaining to 
the green economy.   
 In order to increase room for policy implications, the six governance mechanisms 
(political stability/no violence, “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness, regulation 
quality, rule of law and corruption-control) are bundled to produce four more governance 
channels (i.e. political, economic, institutional and general governance dynamics). The 
interest of bundling and unbundling governance indicators builds on evolutions in the 
conception, measurement and employment of governance terms in scientific scholarly 
reporting. For instance, the term institutional governance is not appropriate to be employed 
unless it is a composite measurement from corruption-control and the rule of law. Hence, it is 
in the interest of avoiding conceptual conflation that the governance indicators are further 
bundled by means of principal component analysis in order for scholarly reporting to be 
consistent with the conception and definition of governance dynamics. An example of a study 
in the literature in which the underlying conceptual conflation is apparent is Kangoye (2013). 
Accordingly, the study has used the term “general governance” in the narratives when 
corruption is employed as the governance dynamic. In the light of this critique and attendant 
example, this research argues that the term “general governance” can exclusively be 
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employed when it is appreciated by indicators that reflect the institutional governance, 
economic governance and political governance. 
 The intuition motivating the connections between variables being investigated in this 
study is simple to follow. The relevance of globalization in governance outcomes has been 
substantially documented in the theoretical and empirical literature (Krueger, 1974; Bhagwati 
& Srinivasan, 1980; Bhagwati, 1982; Klitgaard, 1988; Gatti, 1999; Ades & Di Tella, 1999; 
Wei, 2000; Bonaglia, Braga de Macedo, Bussolo, 2001; Lalountas, Manolas & Vavouras 
2011; Asongu, 2014). Moreover, the importance of governance in CO2 emission has also 
been discussed in the preceding paragraphs.  By building on the established evidence in the 
literature, this research is consistent with the stream of literature arguing that applied 
econometrics should not be exclusively limited to the acceptance and rejection of existing 
models (Narayan, Mishra & Narayan, 2011;  Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). Hence, it is a 
useful scientific activity to build on established theoretical and empirical evidences in order to 
investigate linkages that are relevant to environmental sustainability in the post-2015 
development agenda.   
The rest of the research is structured as follows. The data and methodology are 
covered in section 2. Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical findings while section 4 
concludes with implications and future research directions.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Data  
This study focuses on 44 countries in SSA with data for the period 2000-20123. The data 
come from three main sources, notably: (i) six governance dynamics are obtained from World 
Governance Indicators of the World Bank (political stability/no violence, “voice & 
accountability”, government effectiveness, regulation quality, corruption-control and the rule 
of law); (ii) the outcome variable (i.e. CO2 emissions per capita), globalization variables 
(trade openness and financial openness) and control variables (gross domestic product growth, 
population growth and education) and (iii) the composite governance indicators (i.e. political, 
economic, institutional and general governance) are derived from principal component 
                                                             
3 The 44 countries are: “Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic. Republic., Congo Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia”.  
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analysis (PCA) covered in Section 2.2.1. The geographical and temporal scopes of the study 
are contingent on data availability constraints at the time of the study.  
 Borrowing from recent environmental pollution literature (Asongu, 2018a, 2018b), 
CO2 emission per capita is employed as the indicator for environmental degradation and the 
globalization indicators are proxied by trade (imports + exports) and net foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows. The engaged six governance dynamics are primarily from 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010). According to the attendant literature: “The first 
concept is about the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced (Political 
Governance): voice and accountability and political stability. The second has to do with the 
capacity of government to formulate and implement policies, and to deliver services 
(Economic Governance): regulatory quality and government effectiveness. The last, but by no 
means least, regards the respect for citizens and the state of institutions that govern the 
interactions among them (Institutional Governance): rule of law and control of corruption” 
(Andres, Asongu & Amavilah, 2015, p. 1041). These governance indicators are increasingly 
used in contemporary development literature, notably by: Oluwatobi, Efobi, Olurinola and 
Alege (2015), Ajide and Raheem  (2016a, 2016b) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017b). 
 Still in accordance with the attendant literature which has employed CO2 emission per 
capita as the outcome variable, three principal control variables are adopted in view of 
accounting for variable omission bias, namely: education, population growth and gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth. The three control variables are expected to bear negatively 
on the outcome variable, contingent on the equitable distribution of the fruits of economic 
prosperity across the population. Whereas the relationship between the first control variable 
and the outcome variable is intuitive, the relevance of population growth and economic 
growth is contingent on how the average population participates in the production and 
consumption processes in the economy. For instance, if economic growth is associated with 
more equitable distribution of fruits of economic prosperity across the population, the average 
citizen can contribute more towards the production and consumption processes in the 
domestic economy and by extension participate in the emission of green house gases. 
Conversely, if the fruits of economic prosperity are not equitably distributed, the average 
person is likely to contribute less in the corresponding consumption and production processes.  
 The underlying explanation on economic growth also extends to population growth in 
the perspective that, the poor account for more of the population growth in African countries 
because, the rich have preferred to quality of children to the quantity of children (Asongu, 
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2013). Hence the burden of population growth does not necessarily translate into enhanced 
possibilities of participating more towards green house gas emissions if the fruits of economic 
growth are largely retained by wealthy factions of the population.  Unfortunately, in spite of 
more than two decades of growth resurgence in SSA, the number of people living in extreme 
poverty has been rising. Accordingly, close to half of countries in the sub-region did not 
achieve the millennium development goal (MDG) extreme poverty target (Tchamyou, 2019, 
2020; Tchamyou et al., 2019).  
 The research limits variables in the conditioning information set to three because from 
a pilot empirical analysis, taking on board more than three control variables produces the 
proliferation of instruments which constraints the estimated models to fail post-estimation 
diagnostic tests, even when the specification exercises are tailored such that the instruments 
are collapsed in the processes. It is not uncommon in the application of the Generalised 
Method of Moments for variables in the conditioning information to be three or less than 
three. Examples from the empirical literature include: (i) Bruno, De Bonis and Silvestrini 
(2012) who have used two control variables and (iii) Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017c) and 
Osabuohien and Efobi (2013) who have not used control variables. The definitions and 
sources of the variables are provided in Appendix 1 while the summary statistics is disclosed 
in Appendix 2. Appendix 3 presents the correlation matrix.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA)  
In the light of the motivation of the study (covered in the introduction) and complementary 
discourse in the data section, the PCA technique is used to bundle the six governance 
variables into four composite governance dynamics. Examples of recent economic 
development studies on Africa that have employed the PCA technique to bundle governance 
variables in order to enhance room for policy implications are: Tchamyou (2017) and Asongu, 
le Roux, Nwachukwu and Pyke (2019).  
 The PCA consists to reducing a set of variables that are highly correlated into a 
smaller set of uncorrelated indicators called principal components (PCs). Building on this 
technique: (i) “voice & accountability” and political stability/no violence are reduced to 
political governance; (ii) regulation quality and government effectiveness are reduced to 
economic governance; (iii) the rule of law and corruption-control are reduced to institutional 
governance and (iv) “voice & accountability”, political stability/no violence, regulation 
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quality, government effectiveness, the rule of law and corruption-control are reduced to 
general governance.  
 The Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) rule of thumb is used to retain the composite 
indicators. The rule of thumb suggests that only PCs that are higher than 1 or the mean and 
which reflect about 70% of variation in the constituent indicators should be retained. Table 1 
discloses the PCA findings. In line with the criteria for retaining common factors in the 
various governance dimensions: general governance (G.gov), institutional governance 
(Instgov), economic governance (Ecogov) and political governance (Polgov) respectively, 
reflect variations (eigenvalues)  of   81.50 %, 93.0 %, 93.9 % and 83.5 % (4.892, 1.861, 1.878 
and 1.671).  
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 




 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.395 0.372 0.411 0.426 0.439 0.404 0.815 0.815 4.892 
Second  PC -0.037 0.873 -0.357 -0.303 0.037 -0.124 0.067 0.883 0.407 
Third PC 0.747 -0.035 0.157 -0.131 -0.086 -0.626 0.052 0.935 0.314 
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.835 0.835 1.671 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.164 1.000 0.328 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.939 0.939 1.878 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.060 1.000 0.121 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.930 0.930 1.861 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.069 1.000 0.138 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Econgov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
 
 
2.2.2 GMM: specification, identification and exclusion restrictions  
In the light of the growing application of the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) as 
empirical strategy in development economics, this research adopts the estimation technique 
because of four principal motivations documented in the attendant literature (Tchamyou, 
2019, 2020). The first motivation is that the environmental degradation variable is 
characterized by persistence because the correlation between its level and first lag values is 
greater than 0.800, which is the established rule of thumb for appreciating persistence in a 
variable (Tchamyou et al., 2019). The second motivation is the fulfillment of a baseline 
condition which requires that the number of periods within a cross section should be lower 
than the corresponding number of cross sections. Third, in the empirical exercise, cross-
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country variations are factored-in because the data structure is panel. Fourth, the critical 
concern of endogeneity is tackled on two fronts: (i) simultaneity or reverse causality is taken 
on board by means of an instrumentation process and (ii) the unobserved heterogeneity is also 
controlled with the help of time invariant variables.  
 The empirical framework of Roodman (2009a, 2009b) is adopted in this study because 
of its advantages compared the traditional difference GMM approach (i.e. of Arellano & 
Bover, 1995), that has comparatively less efficient estimates. The updated approach also 
limits the proliferation of instruments. Asongu and Nwachukwu, (2016b), Tchamyou et al. 
(2019) and Boateng, Asongu, Akamavi and Tchamyou (2018) have used the same arguments.    
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarize the standard 
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where, tiC ,  
is the CO emissions variable  of  country i
 
in  period t , 0  is a constant, O  
represents openness (trade openness and financial openness),  G  consists of  governance  
dynamics (political stability, voice & accountability, government effectiveness, regulation 
quality, rule of law, corruption-control, political governance, economic governance, 
institutional governance and general governance), 
 
OG  denotes an interaction between an 
openness variable and a governance dynamic (“political stability” × “openness”, “voice & 
accountability” × “openness”, “government effectiveness” × “openness”, “regulation quality” 
× “openness”, “corruption-control” × “openness”,  “rule of law” × “openness”, “political 
governance” × “openness”, “economic governance” × “openness”, “institutional governance” 
× “openness” and “general governance” × “openness”),   
 
W  is the vector of control variables 
(GDP growth, population growth and education),   represents the coefficient of auto-
regression which is one within the framework of this study because a year lag is enough to 
capture past information, t  




is the country-specific effect and 





2.2.3 Identification and exclusion restrictions 
 Cognizant of the process of specification discussed in the previous section, this study 
is in accordance with the contemporary research in its strategy of identification and 
assumption of exclusion restrictions, notably: Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016c), Tchamyou 
and Asongu (2017), Meniago and Asongu (2018), Tchamyou et al. (2019) and Boateng et al. 
(2018). The identification approach is such that the time invariant variables are defined as 
strictly exogenous whereas the endogenous explaining indicators are acknowledged to be 
explanatory variables.  Such an approach to identification is consistent with Roodman (2009b) 
who has argued that it is not feasible for the identified strictly exogenous variables to the 
exogenous after a first difference4.  
 In line with the strategy of identification, the corresponding exclusion restriction 
assumption is examined with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT). The null hypothesis of 
this test should not be rejected in order for the outcome variable to be elucidated exclusively 
via the predetermined or endogenous explaining variables. Hence, this null hypothesis is the 
position that the instruments are valid. This procedure for assessing and validating the 
adopted identification approach is not dissimilar to the standard instrumental variable (IV) 
approach from which, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan test implies that the 
instruments elucidate the outcome indicator exclusively through the identified mechanisms 
captured in the endogenous explaining variables, notably: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(2003) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016d).  
 
 
3. Presentation of results 
3.1 Empirical results  
 Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 disclose the empirical results on linkages 
between globalization, governance and CO2 emissions. Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 
respectively focus on political governance, economic governance, institutional governance 
and general governance. Tables 2-4 are respectively divided into three categories: the first-
two focus on components the governance variables whereas the last shows findings from the 
composite governance variable derived from PCA. Each category is characterized by both 
trade- and FDI-oriented specifications.  
                                                             
4 Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
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In order to assess the overall validity of estimated models, four principal information 
criteria are use to examine the validity of post-estimation diagnostics5. In the light of these 
criteria, the estimated models are overwhelmingly valid with a few exceptions: (i) the last 
specification of Table 4 and (ii) the third and fifth specifications of Table 5. These 
specifications are not valid because the alternative hypothesis of the Hansen test is not 
rejected. The Hansen test is more relevant than the Sargan test because it is robust, though 
weakened by the proliferation of instruments. Hence, given that the Sargan test is not robust, 
but not weakened by the proliferation of instruments, a means of dealing with the conflict is to 
give priority to the Hansen test and limit the proliferation of instruments by ensuring that the 
number of instruments is less than the corresponding number of countries in each 
specification.  
In order to investigate the total impact of the role of globalization in moderating the 
effect of governance on CO2 emissions, net impacts are calculated. The calculation of these 
net impacts consists of engaging the unconditional and conditional impacts of governance 
variables. For example, in the third column of Table 2, the net effect of financial openness in 
modulating the effect of political stability on CO2 emissions is 0.0396 ([-0.001× 5.381] + 
[0.045]). In the calculation, the average value of FDI is 5.381, the unconditional impact of 
political stability is 0.045 and conditional effect from the interaction between political 
stability and FDI is -0.001.  
The following findings can be established from Tables 2-5. First, in Table 2: (i) FDI 
modulates political stability to induce a positive net effect on CO2 emissions and (ii) trade 
moderates “voice & accountability” to have a negative net effect on CO2 emissions. Second, 
in Table 3, trade moderates government effectiveness and economic governance to 
respectively have negative and positive net effects on CO2 emissions.  Third, in Table 4, trade 
modulates the rule of law and institutional governance to bear positive net effects on CO2 
emissions while it moderates corruption-control to have a negative net effect on CO2 
emissions. Fourth, the significant control variables have the expected signs.  
 
                                                             
5
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments . In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of 




Table 2: Political governance, globalization and environmental degradation 
       
 Dependent variable:  CO2 emissions per capita 
       
 Political Stability (PS) Voice & Accountability (VA) Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
 Trade G. Financial  G. Trade G. Financial  G. Trade G. Financial  G. 
CO2 emissions (-1) 0.929*** 0.901*** 0.933*** 0.891*** 0.935*** 0.885*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stability (PS) 0.049 0.045** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.146) (0.049)     
Voice & Accountability (VA) --- --- -0.090**  0.113 --- --- 
   (0.027) (0.176)   
Political Governance (Polgov)  --- --- --- ---   0.009 0.098** 
     (0.753) (0.016) 
Trade Globalization (Trade) -0.001** --- -0.0001 --- -0.0008* --- 
 (0.023)  (0.787)  (0.057)  
Financial Globalization (Fin) --- -0.002*** --- 0.0007 --- 0.0002 
  (0.005)  (0.709)  (0.768) 
PS ×Trade -0.0005 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.133)      
VA × Trade --- --- 0.001** --- --- --- 
   (0.016)    
Polgov × Trade --- --- --- --- -0.0004 --- 
     (0.205)  
PS ×Fin --- -0.001* --- --- --- --- 
  (0.078)     
VA × Fin --- --- --- -0.0001 --- --- 
    (0.928)   
Polgov × Fin --- --- --- --- --- -0.0004 
      (0.471) 
GDP growth  -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.002** 
 (0.122) (0.037) (0.239) (0.711) (0.429) (0.013) 
Population growth  -0.107*** -0.120*** -0.090*** -0.121*** -0.097*** -0.123*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education  0.002** -0.0008 0.002 0.001 .0009 0.001 
 (0.022) (0.489) (0.169) (0.609) (0.557) (0.573) 
       
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net effects na 0.0396 -0.0132 na na na 
Thresholds  45 90    
       
AR(1) (0.125) (0.133) (0.131) (0.131) (0.124) (0.126) 
AR(2) (0.155) (0.158) (0.166) (0.155) (0.163) (0.146) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.534) (0.274) (0.689) (0.839) (0.712) (0.404) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.222) (0.025) (0.114) (0.131) (0.173) (0.045) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.621) (0.662) (0.873) (0.959) (0.840) (0.738) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.537) (0.246) (0.276) (0.585) (0.666) (0.409) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.453) (0.359) (0.886) (0.834) (0.587) (0.389) 
       
Fisher  18321.75*** 10293.13*** 29383.52*** 3120.04*** 33618.88*** 4955.03*** 
Instruments  36 36 36 36 36 36 
Countries  43 43 43 43 43 43 
Observations  294 295 294 295 294 295 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for 
the computation of net effects is not significant.  Constants are involved in the regressions. The mean value of trade openness is 76.759 while 










Table 3: Economic governance, globalization and environmental degradation 
       
 Dependent variable:  CO2 emissions per capita 
       
 Regulation Quality 





    
 Trade G. Financial  G. Trade G. Financial  G. Trade G. Financial  G. 
CO2 emissions (-1) 0.910*** 0.879*** 0.937*** 0.919*** 0.918*** 0.899*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regulation Quality  (RQ) 0.140** 0.225*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.049) (0.001)     
Government Effectiveness (GE) --- --- 0.076* 0.014 --- --- 
   (0.061) (0.591)   
Economic Governance (Ecogov)  --- --- --- --- 0.056* 0.060*** 
     (0.056) (0.003) 
Trade Globalization (Trade) -0.001** --- -0.003*** --- -0.001*** --- 
 (0.015)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Financial Globalization (Fin) --- -0.002* --- 0.0004 --- -0.001** 
  (0.061)  (0.785)  (0.026) 
RQ ×Trade -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.157)      
GE × Trade --- --- -0.001*** --- --- --- 
   (0.003)    
Ecogov × Trade --- --- --- --- -0.0007*** --- 
     (0.040)  
RQ ×Fin --- -0.001 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.288)     
GE × Fin --- --- --- 0.0008 --- --- 
    (0.570)   
Ecogov × Fin --- --- --- --- --- -0.0009 
      (0.254) 
GDP growth  -0.0004 -0.001* -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.677) (0.067) (0.373) (0.021) (0.278) (0.002) 
Population growth  -0.110*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.086*** -0.108*** -0.090*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education  -0.0005 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.757) (0.165) (0.705) (0.363) (0.277) (0.197) 
       
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net effects na na -0.0007 na 0.0022 na 
Thresholds   76  80  
       
AR(1) (0.129) (0.146) (0.125) (0.128) (0.123) (0.130) 
AR(2) (0.158) (0.153) (0.162) (0.165) (0.160) (0.156) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.588) (0.264) (0.356) (0.323) (0.430) (0.138) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.033) (0.075) (0.158) (0.108) (0.215) (0.088) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.932) (0.464) (0.470) (0.489) (0.509) (0.244) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.212) (0.339) (0.060) (0.028) (0.120) (0.069) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.851) (0.265) (0.890) (0.973) (0.816) (0.414) 
       
Fisher  75860.65*** 10303.64*** 18747.56*** 69032.16*** 105612*** 21962.50*** 
Instruments  36 36 36 36 36 36 
Countries  43 43 43 43 43 43 
Observations  294 295 294 295 294 295 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for 
the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are involved in the regressions. The mean value of trade openness is 76.759 while 












Table 4: Institutional governance, globalization and environmental degradation 
       
 Dependent variable:  CO2 emissions per capita 
       
 Rule of  Law  
(RL)  
Corruption Control  
 (CC)  
Institutional Governance 
(Instgov) 
    
 Trade G. Financial  G. Trade G. Financial  G. Trade G. Financial  G. 
CO2 emissions (-1) 0.896*** 0.845*** 0.927*** 0.930*** 0.915*** 0.921*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of Law (RL) 0.230** 0.258*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.011) (0.000)     
Corruption Control  (CC) --- --- 0.127** -0.004 --- --- 
   (0.026) (0.841)   
Institutional  Governance (Instgov)  --- --- --- --- 0.085** 0.019* 
     (0.018) (0.082) 
Trade Globalization (Trade) -0.002** --- -0.002*** --- -0.001** --- 
 (0.019)  (0.000)  (0.010)  
Financial Globalization (Fin) --- -0.002 --- -0.002* --- -0.0007 
  (0.249)  (0.081)  (0.211) 
RL × Trade -0.001* --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.064)      
CC × Trade --- --- -0.002** --- --- --- 
   (0.012)    
Instgov × Trade --- --- --- --- -0.0008** --- 
     (0.034)  
RL × Fin --- -0.001 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.485)     
CC × Fin --- --- --- -0.001 --- --- 
    (0.268)   
Instgov × Fin --- --- --- --- --- -0.001 
      (0.165) 
GDP growth  -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.003*** 
 (0.570) (0.462) (0.022) (0.010) (0.030) (0.001) 
Population growth  -0.101*** -0.129*** -0.133*** -0.101*** -0.111*** -0.086*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education  -0.003** -0.004** -0.0008   0.0009 -0.002* -0.0006 
 (0.027) (0.013) (0.531) (0.280) (0.078) (0.577) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
       
Net effects 0.1532 na -0.0265 na 0.0788 na 
Thresholds 230  63.5  106.25  
       
AR(1) (0.121) (0.131) (0.130) (0.132) (0.122) (0.124) 
AR(2) (0.158) (0.153) (0.153) (0.164) (0.153) (0.161) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.541) (0389) (0.448) (0.291) (0.103) (0.077) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.149) (0.027) (0.054) (0.026) (0.151) (0.022) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.694) (0.800) (0.755) (0.681) (0.143) (0.265) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.168) (0.489) (0.326) (0.134) (0.506) (0.126) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.859) (0.315) (0.523) (0.565) (0.051) (0.150) 
       
Fisher  23428.75*** 8807.31*** 19844.12*** 16498.84*** 28062.78*** 16555.85*** 
Instruments  36 36 36 36 36 36 
Countries  43 43 43 43 43 43 
Observations  294 295 294 295 294 295 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for 
the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are involved in the regressions. The mean value of trade openness is 76.759 while 









Table 5: General governance, globalization and environmental degradation 
     
 Dependent variable:  CO2 emissions per capita 
   
 Trade G. Financial  G. 
CO2 emissions (-1) 0.880*** 0.920*** 0.949*** 0.892*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
General Governance (Ggov) -0.001 0.054*** -0.039** 0.051*** 
 (0.926) (0.008) (0.026) (0.000) 
Trade Globalization (Trade) -0.001* -0.001*** --- --- 
 (0.096) (0.000)   
Financial Globalization (Fin) --- --- -0.0005 -0.001* 
   (0.561) (0.071) 
Ggov ×Trade 0.0001 -0.0005** --- --- 
 (0.645) (0.018)   
Ggov × Fin --- --- 0.0003 -0.0005 
   (0.325) (0.269) 
GDP growth  --- -0.002** --- -0.003*** 
  (0.024)  (0.000) 
Population growth  --- -0.106*** --- -0.098*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Education  --- -0.002 --- -0.001 
  (0.146)  (0.119) 
     
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Net effects na nsa na na 
Thresholds     
     
AR(1) (0.087) (0.120) (0.096) (0.126) 
AR(2) (0.702) (0.155) (0.736) (0.149) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.424) (0.073) (0.200) (0.059) 
DHT for instruments     
(a)Instruments in levels     
H excluding group --- (0.203) --- (0.036) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.753) (0.087) (0.432) (0.168) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))     
H excluding group --- (0.354) --- (0.084) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) --- (0.051) --- (0.152) 
     
Fisher  1248.47*** 43461.27*** 5675.19*** 16087.23*** 
Instruments  25 36 25 36 
Countries  44 43 44 43 
Observations  404 294 415 295 
     
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for 
the computation of net effects is not significant . Constants are involved in the regressions. The mean value of trade openness is 76.759 while 




3.2 Extended analysis with thresholds 
Cognizant of the motivation of this study, the empirical analysis is extended by establishing 
specific thresholds at which globalization modulates governance to either positively or 
negatively affect CO2 emissions. In this light, a positive threshold is a critical mass at which 
the overall moderating effect changes from negative to positive whereas a negative threshold 
is a critical mass at which the overall modulating impact changes from positive to negative. 
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The underlying conception of threshold is consistent with contemporary development 
literature, notably: Batuo (2015) and Asongu and Odhiambo (2019b, 2019c) on inflexion 
points for economic ramifications and Ashraf and Galor (2013) on the basis for economic 
interactions that reflect inverted U-shapes and U-shapes.  
 Given the findings established in Tables 2-5, positive thresholds are computable where 
marginal or conditional effects are positive while negative thresholds are also computable 
when marginal impacts are negative. For instance, in the third column of Table 2, the 
corresponding negative threshold is 45 (0.045/0.001). Hence, when net FDI inflows is 45(% 
of GDP), the unconditional positive effect of political stability on CO2 emissions is 
completely nullified ([-0.001× 45] + [0.045] =0). Hence the minimum level of FDI required 
for it to interact with political stability and contribute towards the green economy by 
dampening CO2 emissions is 45 (% of GDP) of net FDI inflows. With the same 
computational analogy, in the fourth column of Table 2, the positive threshold corresponding 
to the interaction between “voice & accountability” and trade is 90 (0.090/0.001)  % of GDP. 
Hence, a 90% of GDP is the maximum required for trade to complement “voice & 
accountability” in mitigating CO2 emissions. Accordingly, owing to the positive marginal 
effect, above this positive threshold, the interaction between trade and “voice & 
accountability” produces positive effects on CO2 emissions. It follows that, in the light of the 
outcome variable which is a policy syndrome, positive thresholds (related to positive marginal 
effects) are maximum points that should not be surpassed in order for the underlying 
interactions to promote the green economy. Conversely, negative thresholds (associated with 
negative marginal effects) are minimum points that should be surpassed in order for the 
underlying interactions to enhance the green economy.  
 In the light of the above clarifications, in Table 3, 76 (% of GDP) and 80 (% of GDP) 
are respectively negative trade thresholds for government effectiveness and economic 
governance. In Table 4, the corresponding negative thresholds for the rule of law, corruption-
control and institutional governance are respectively, 230 (% of GDP), 63.5 (% of GDP) and 
106.5 (% of GDP). The established thresholds make economic sense and are actionable policy 
measures because they are within the range of trade openness (20.964 to 209.874) disclosed in 






4. Concluding implications, caveats and future research directions 
 The purpose of this study is to assess linkages between globalization, governance and 
CO2 emissions in 44 SSA countries for the period 2002-2012. The EKC hypotheses are tested 
and net effects from interactions as well as policy thresholds are also established. 
Globalization is appreciated from trade (imports + exports) and net foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows. The empirical evidence is based on Generalized Method of Moments.  The 
following main findings are established. 
 First, concerning the net effects: (i) FDI modulates political stability to induce a 
positive net effect on CO2 emissions and (ii) trade moderates “voice & accountability” to 
have a negative effect on CO2 emissions; (iii) trade moderates government effectiveness and 
economic governance to respectively have negative and positive net effects on CO2 emissions 
and (iv) trade modulates the rule of law and institutional governance to bear positive net 
effects on CO2 emissions while it moderates corruption-control to have a negative net effect 
on CO2 emissions. 
Second, the minimum level (or negative threshold) of FDI required for it to interact 
with political stability and contribute towards the green economy by dampening CO2 
emissions is 45(% of GDP), while 90% of GDP is the maximum level (or positive threshold) 
required for the trade to complement “voice & accountability” in mitigating CO2 emissions. 
76 (% of GDP) and 80 (% of GDP) are respectively, negative trade thresholds for government 
effectiveness and economic governance. The corresponding negative trade thresholds for the 
rule of law, corruption-control and institutional governance are respectively, 230 (% of GDP), 
63.5 (% of GDP) and 106.5 (% of GDP). The established thresholds make economic sense 
and are actionable policy measures because they are within the ranges of trade openness and 
FDI disclosed in the summary statistics.  
It is also relevant complement this concluding implications by emphasizing that the 
negative thresholds are associated with Kuznets shapes whereas positive thresholds are linked 
with inverted U shapes.  Therefore, in the light of the motivation of this research which is that 
establishing Kuznets and U shapes from investigating the EKC hypothesis is not enough for 
actionable policies, complementary net effects and policy thresholds established in this study 
are worthwhile because they avail room for more policy implications.   
In the light of the above, this study has fulfilled its goal of providing actionable 
openness policy thresholds to inform policy makers on how governance interacts with 
globalization to promote the green economy. The study has shown that these thresholds are 
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contingent on governance dynamics and hence, given the divergent context of governance in 
sub-Saharan Africa, countries with poor governance standards may need higher globalization 
thresholds compared to their counterparts with better governance standards. This inference is 
premised on the fact that the unconditional incidence of governance on CO2 emissions is 
overwhelmingly positive while globalization contributes towards dampening the underlying 
positive incidence of the governance dynamics on CO2 emissions.  
The findings also inform policy makers that with the implementation of the African 
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2021 which is designed to improve trade openness 
within Africa, the attendant incidence of trade openness in favorably modulating governance 
to promote the green economy in Africa would be enhanced. Such enhancement would be 
more apparent if AfCFTA policies surrounding the promotion of sustainable development by 
means of preserving the environment are properly implemented by sampled countries who 
have signed the AfCFTA Agreement.  
While the findings of this study are relevant to other developing countries, the 
corresponding trade thresholds in the attendant developing countries may be much lower 
compared to the sampled countries in this study because other developing countries have 
comparatively higher standards of governance on the one hand and on the other, over the past 
70 years, while the share of other developing countries in world trade has been increasing, the 
corresponding share of Africa has decreased by more than 50% over the same period (Fofack, 
2014). Accordingly, governance variables have both positive and negative values and the 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have been documented to be associated with more negative 
values compared to other developing countries (Tchamyou, 2021). Moreover, Africa’s 
contribution to world trade has dropped to 1.5% from more than 3.8% in the 1950s (Asongu 
& Tchamyou, 2020).  
 The principal caveat of this research is that country-specific effects are eliminated 
because the GMM approach is tailored to eliminate such country-specific impacts in order to 
control for endogeneity. Hence, future research should engaged relevant estimation 
approaches to assess whether   the established tendencies in this study withstand empirical 










Appendix 1: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables (Measurements) Sources 
    
CO2 per capita CO2mtpc CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
 
Political Stability  
 PolS “Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Voice & Accountability  VA “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent 
to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government and to enjoy freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Political Governance  Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice 
& Accountability. The process by which those in authority 
are  selected and replaced. 
PCA 




GE “Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality 
of public services, the quality and degree of independence 
from political pressures of the civil service, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Regulation  Quality  RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Economic Governance  Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness 
and Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to 
formulate & implement policies, and to deliver services”.  
              PCA 
    
 





“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the 










“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of 
the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-
Control. The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
General Governance  Ggov First Principal Component of Political, Economic and 
Institutional Governances   
PCA 
    
Trade Openness  Trade  Exports plus Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Financial Openness  FDI Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows (% of GDP) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
GDP growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Population growth  Popg Population growth rate (annual %) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Educational Quality Educ Pupil teacher ratio in Primary Education  World Bank 
(WDI) 






Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2000-2012) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
CO2 per capita 0.911 1.842 0.016 10.093 532 
Political Stability  -0.486 0.923 -2.660 1.192 496 
Voice & Accountability  -0.543 0.687 -1.838 0.986 496 
Political Governance  0.140 1.230 -2.653 2.583 496 
Government Effectiveness  -0.697 0.584 -1.960 0.934 496 
Regulation Quality  -0.604 0.542 -2.110 0.983 496 
Economic Governance   0.205 1.225 -2.288 3.807 496 
Rule of Law -0.663 0.614 -2.113 1.056 496 
Corruption-Control -0.590 0.565 -1.566 1.249 496 
Institutional Governance   0.144 1.282 -2.391 3.766 496 
General Governance  0.284 2.040 -4.567 5.561 496 
Trade  Openness  76.759 35.381 20.964 209.874 519 
Financial Openness  5.381 8.834 -6.043 91.007 529 
GDP growth  4.801 5.054 -32.832 33.735 530 
Population growth  2.335 0.876 -1.081 6.576 495 
Educational Quality  43.892 14.775 12.466 100.236 397 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 347) 
                 
 Governance Dynamics   Control variables Dependent 
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance  Openness    Variable 
 PolS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov RL CC Instgov G.gov Trade FDI GDPg Popg Educ CO2mtpc 
PolS 1.000                
VA 0.719 1.000               
Polgov 0.928 0.925 1.000              
GE 0.678 0.759 0.775 1.000             
RQ 0.627 0.703 0.717 0.883 1.000            
Ecogov 0.674 0.756 0.771 0.974 0.966 1.000           
RL 0.813 0.829 0.886 0.891 0.829 0.889 1.000          
CC 0.719 0.718 0.775 0.857 0.775 0.844 0.867 1.000         
Instgov 0.792 0.800 0.858 0.904 0.830 0.896 0.965 0.967 1.000        
G.gov 0.839 0.872 0.923 0.937 0.886 0.941 0.967 0.913 0.972 1.000       
Trade 0.270 0.106 0.204 0.114 0.065 0.094 0.217 0.179 0.204 0.177 1.000      
FDI -0.01 -0.03 -0.030 -0.10 -0.14 -0.126 -0.06 -0.02 -0.082 -0.08 0.344 1.000     
GDPg -0.09 -0.01 -0.060 -0.01 -0.08 -0.045 -0.05 -0.06 -0.063 -0.05 -0.02 0.170 1.000    
Popg -0.34 -0.26 -0.328 -0.41 -0.28 -0.362 -0.38 -0.45 -0.433 -0.39 -0.43 0.086 0.207 1.000   
Educ -0.35 -0.40 -0.407 -0.39 -0.30 -0.365 -0.41 -0.42 -0.435 -0.42 -0.38 -0.09 0.116 0.440 1.000  
CO2mtpc 0.314 0.412 0.391 0.553 0.399 0.496 0.438 0.493 0.482 0.484 0.174 -0.06 -0.08 -0.537 -0.44 1.000 
                 
PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation 
Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance.  FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. RL: Rule of Law. CC: Corruption-Control. Instgov: Institutional 
Governance. Ggov: General Governance. GDP: Gross Domestic Product growth. Popg: Population growth. Educ: Education quality. 
















Ades, A., & Di Tella, R., (1999). “Rents, competition and corruption”, American Economic  
Review, 89(4), pp. 982-993. 
 
Afful-Koomson, T., (2012). “Governance Challenges for a Green Economy in Africa”, United 
Nations University,  
https://unu.edu/publications/articles/governance-challenges-for-a-green-economy-in-
africa.html (Accessed: 07/04/2017). 
 
Ajide, K. B, & Raheem, I. D., (2016a). “Institutions-FDI Nexus in ECOWAS Countries”, 
Journal of African Business, 17(3), pp. 319-341.  
 
Ajide, K. B, & Raheem, I. D., (2016b). “The Institutional Quality Impact on Remittances in 
the ECOWAS Sub-Region”, African Development Review, 28(4), pp. 462–481. 
 
Akbostanci, E., S. Turut-Asi &  Tunc, G. I.,  (2009). “The Relationship between Income and 
Environment in Turkey: Is there an Environmental Kuznets Curve?”, Energy Policy, 37(3), 
pp. 861-867. 
 
Akinlo, A. E., (2008). “Energy consumption and economic growth: evidence from 11 Sub-
Sahara African countries”. Energy Economics, 30(5), pp. 2391-2400. 
 
Akinyemi, O.,  Alege, P., Osabuohien, E.,  &  Ogundipe, A.,  (2015). “Energy Security and 
the Green Growth Agenda in Africa: Exploring Trade-offs and Synergies”, Department of 
Economics and Development Studies, Covenant University, Nigeria.  
 
Akinyemi, O., Efobi, U., Asongu, S., & Osabuohien, E., (2018). “Green Growth Strategy and 
Trade Performance in sub-Saharan Africa”, Department of Economics and Development 
Studies, Covenant University, Nigeria.  
 
Akpan, G. E. & Akpan, U. F. (2012). “Electricity Consumption, Carbon Emissions and 
Economic Growth in Nigeria”, International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 2(4), 
pp. 292-306. 
 
Amavilah, V., Asongu, S. A., & Andrés, A. R., (2017). “Effects of globalization on peace and 
stability: Implications for governance and the knowledge economy of African countries”, 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 122 (September), pp. 91-103. 
 
Andrés,  R. A, Asongu, S. A., &  Amavilah, V. H., (2015). “The Impact of Formal Institutions 
on Knowledge Economy”, Journal of the Knowledge Economy, 6(4), pp. 1034-1062. 
 
Ang, J. B. (2007). “CO2 emissions, energy consumption, and output in France”, Energy 
Policy, 35(10), pp. 4772-4778. 
 
Anyangwe, E.  (2014). “Without energy could Africa’s growth run out of steam?” 
theguardian, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-




Apergis, N. &  J. Payne, J. E., (2009). “CO2 emissions, energy usage, and output in Central 
America”, Energy Policy, 37(8), pp. 3282-3286. 
 
Arellano, M., & Bover, O., (1995), “Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of 
error components models”, Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), pp. 29-52. 
 
Ashraf, Q., & Galor, O., (2013). “The Out of Africa Hypothesis, Human Genetic Diversity, 
and Comparative Economic Development”. American Economic Review, 103(1), pp. 1-46. 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2013). “How Would Population Growth Affect Investment in the Future? 
Asymmetric Panel Causality Evidence for Africa”, African Development Review, 25(1), pp. 
14-29. 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2014). “Globalisation (fighting) corruption and development. How are these 
phenomena linearly and non-linearly related in wealth effects?”, Journal of Economic Studies, 
41(3), pp.  346-369.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2017). “Knowledge Economy Gaps, Policy Syndromes and Catch-up 
Strategies: Fresh South Korean Lessons to Africa”, Journal of the Knowledge Economy, 8(1), 
pp. 211–253. 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2018a). “ICT, Openness and CO2 emissions in Africa”, Environmental 
Science and Pollution Research, 25(10), pp. 9351-9359. 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2018b). “CO2 emission thresholds for inclusive human development in sub-
Saharan Africa”, Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 25(26), pp. 26005-26019. 
 
Asongu S. A., & De Moor, L., (2017). “Financial globalisation dynamic thresholds for 
financial development: evidence from Africa”, European Journal of Development Research, 
29(1), pp. 192–212.  
 
Asongu, S. A., Efobi, U. R., & Tchamyou, V. S., (2018a). “Globalisation and governance in 
Africa: a critical contribution to the empirics”, International Journal of Development Issues, 
17(1), pp. 2-27. 
 
Asongu, S. A., le Roux, S., Nwachukwu, J. C., & Pyke, C., (2019).“The Mobile Phone as an 
Argument for Good Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Information Technology & People, 
32(4), pp. 897-920.  
 
Asongu, S. A., le Roux, S., & Biekpe, N., (2017). “Environmental degradation, ICT and 
inclusive development in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Energy Policy, 111(December), pp. 353-361. 
 
Asongu, S. A., le Roux, S.,, & Biekpe, N., (2018). “Enhancing ICT for environmental 
sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 
127(February), pp. 209-216.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2016a). “Revolution empirics: predicting the Arab 




Asongu, S. A, & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2016b). “The Mobile Phone in the Diffusion of 
Knowledge for Institutional Quality in Sub Saharan Africa”, World Development, 86 
(October), pp. 133-147. 
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2016c). “The Role of Governance in Mobile Phones for 
Inclusive Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Technovation, 55-56 (September-
October), pp. 1-13.  
 
Asongu, S. A, & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2016d). “Foreign aid and governance in Africa”, 
International Review of Applied Economics, 30(1), pp. 69-88.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2017a).“Quality of Growth Empirics: Comparative 
Gaps, Benchmarking and Policy Syndromes”, Journal of Policy Modeling, 39(5), pp.861-882. 
 
Asongu, S. A, & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2017b). “Is the Threat of Foreign Aid Withdrawal an 
Effective Deterrent to Political Oppression? Evidence from 53 African Countries”, Journal of 
Economic Issues, 51(1), pp. 201-221.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2017c).“ Foreign Aid and Inclusive Development: 
Updated Evidence from Africa, 2005–2012”, Social Science Quarterly, 98(1), pp. 282-298.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Odhiambo, N. M., (2019a). “Environmental Degradation and Inclusive 
Human Development in Sub‐ Saharan Africa”, Sustainable Development, 27(1), pp. 25-34.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Odhiambo, N. M., (2019b). “Basic formal education quality, information 
technology, and inclusive human development in sub‐Saharan Africa”, Sustainable 
Development, 27(3), pp. 419-428.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Odhiambo, N. M., (2019c). “Mobile banking usage, quality of growth, 
inequality and poverty in developing countries”, Information Development, 35(2), pp.303-
318.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Odhiambo, N. M., (2021a). “The green economy and inequality in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Avoidable thresholds and thresholds for complementary policies”, Energy 
Exploration & Exploitation, DOI: 10.1177/0144598720984226.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Odhiambo, N. M., (2021b). “Enhancing governance for environmental 
sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa”, Energy Exploration & Exploitation, 39(1), pp. 444-463. 
 
Asongu, S. A., & Tchamyou, V.  S., (2020). “Human Capital, Knowledge Creation, 
Knowledge Diffusion, Institutions and Economic Incentives: South Korea Versus Africa”, 
Contemporary Social Science, 15(1), pp. 26-47. 
 
Batuo, M. E., (2015). “The role of telecommunications infrastructure in the regional economic 
growth of Africa”, Journal of Development Areas, 49(1), pp. 313-330.  
 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R., (2003), “Law and finance: why does legal origin 




Bhagwati, J. (1982). “Directly unproductive, profit-seeking (DUP) activities”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 90(5), pp. 988-1002. 
 
Bhagwati, J. & Srinivasan, T. N. (1980). “Revenue seeking: a generalisation of the theory of 
tariffs”, Journal of Political Economy, 88(6), pp. 1069-1087.  
 
Begum, R. A., Sohag, K.,  Abdullah S. M. S.,  &  Jaafar, M., (2015). “CO2 emissions, energy 
consumption, economic and population growth in Malaysia”, Renewal and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews, 41(January), pp. 594-601. 
 
Boateng, A., Asongu, S, Akamavi, R., & Tchamyou, V., (2018). “Information asymmetry and 
market power in the African banking industry”, Journal of Multinational Financial 
Management,  44(March), pp. 69-83.   
 
Bölük, G., & Mehmet, M., (2015). “The renewable energy, growth and environmental 
Kuznets curve in Turkey: An ARDL approach”, Renewal and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 
52(December), pp. 587-595. 
 
Bonaglia, F., Braga de Macedo, J. &  Bussolo, M. (2001). “How globalization improves 
governance”, Working Paper, No. 181, OECD, Paris. 
 
Bruno, G., De Bonis, R., & Silvestrini, A., (2012). “Do financial systems converge? New 
evidence from financial assets in OECD countries”. Journal of Comparative Economics, 
40(1), pp. 141-155. 
 
Chemutai, B., (2009). “Achieving Effective National Environmental Governance in Africa”, I 
SS Today,  https://issafrica.org/iss-today/achieving-effective-national-environmental-
governance-in-africa (Accessed: 07/04/2017).  
 
Efobi, U., Tanankem, B., Orkoh, E., Atata, S. N., Akinyemi, O., & Beecroft, I., (2019). 
“Environmental Pollution Policy of Small Businesses in Nigeria and Ghana: Extent and 
Impact”, Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 26(3), pp 2882–2897. 
 
Esso, L. J. (2010). “Threshold cointegration and causality relationship between energy use 
and growth in seven African countries”, Energy Economics, 32(6), pp. 1383-1391. 
 
Diao, X. D., Zeng, S. X.,  Tam, C. M. & Tam, V. W .Y., (2009). “EKC Analysis for Studying 
Economic Growth and Environmental Quality: A Case Study in China”, Journal of Cleaner 
Production, 17(5), pp. 541-548.  
 
Fofack, H., (2014). “The Idea of Economic Development: Views from Africa”, WIDER 
Working Paper 2014/093, Helsinki.  
 
Gatti, R. (1999). “Corruption and trade tariffs, or a case for uniform tariffs”, Working Paper. 
No. 2216, World Bank Policy Research, Washington, DC. 
 
He, J., & Richard, P., (2010). “Environmental Kuznets Curve for Co2 in Canada”, Ecological 




Hongwu, L., (2013). “How to solve African governance and development issues: A 
perspective from China”,  BRIDGES AFRICA, 
http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/how-to-solve-african-governance-and-
development-issues-a (Accessed: 07/04/2017). 
 
Jarrett, M. B., (2017). “Lights out: poor governance and Africa's energy crisis”, The Africa 
Report. http://www.theafricareport.com/News-Analysis/lights-out-africas.html (Accessed: 
01/12/2018).  
 
Jolliffe, I. T. (2002) Principal Component Analysis (2nd Ed.) New York: Springer.  
 
Jones, K. R., (2003). “Multilateral Environmental Agreements in Africa: Efforts and 
Problems in Implementation”, International Environmental Agreements, 3(2), pp.  97-135.   
 
Jumbe, C. B., (2004). “Cointegration and Causality between Electricity Consumption and 
GDP: Empirical Evidence from Malawi”, Energy Economics, 26(1), pp. 61-68. 
 
Kaiser, H. F. (1974) “An index of factorial simplicity” Psychometrika 39(1), pp. 31–36.  
Kangoye, T., (2013). “Does Aid Unpredictability Weaken Governance? Evidence From 
Developing Countries”, The Developing Economies, 51(2), pp. 121-144. 
 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A & Mastruzzi, M., (2010). “The worldwide governance indicators: 
Methodology and analytical Issues”. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 5430, 
Washington.  
 
Kifle, T. (2008). “Africa hit hardest by Global Warming despite its low Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions”, Institute for World Economics and International Management Working Paper 
No. 108, http://www.iwim.uni-bremen.de/publikationen/pdf/b108.pdf (Accessed: 
08/09/2015).  
 
Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling Corruption, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA 
and London. 
 
Krueger, A. (1974), “The political economy of the rent seeking society”, American Economic 
Review,  64(3), pp. 291-303. 
 
Lalountas, D.A., Manolas, G.A., & Vavouras, I. S., (2011), “ Corruption, globalization and 
development: How are these three phenomena related?”, Journal of Policy Modeling, 33(4), 
pp. 636-648. 
 
McGrath, M., (2018). “Cars and coal help drive 'strong' CO2 rise in 2018”, Science & 
Environment, https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-46447459 (Accessed: 
09/12/2018) 
 
Mehrara, M., (2007). “Energy consumption and economic growth: The case of oil exporting 




Meniago, C., & Asongu, S. A., (2018). “Revisiting the finance-inequality nexus in a panel of 
African countries”, Research in International Business and Finance, 46(December), pp. 399-
419.  
 
Menyah, K., & Wolde-Rufael, Y., (2010). “Energy consumption, pollutant emissions and 
economic growth in South Africa”, Energy Economics, 32(6), pp. 1374-1382. 
 
Narayan, P.K., Mishra, S., & Narayan, S., (2011). “Do market capitalization and stocks traded 
converge? New global evidence”. Journal of Banking and Finance, 35(10), pp.2771-2781. 
 
Odhiambo, N. M., (2009a). “Electricity consumption and economic growth in South Africa: a 
trivariate causality test”. Energy Economics, 31(5), pp. 635–640. 
 
Odhiambo, N. M., (2009b). “Energy consumption and economic growth nexus in Tanzania: 
an ARDL bounds testing approach”. Energy Policy, 37 (2), pp. 617–622.  
 
Odhiambo, N. M., (2010). “Energy Consumption, Prices and Economic Growth in Three SSA 
Countries: A Comparative Study” Energy Policy, 38(5), pp. 2463-2469.  
 
Odhiambo, N. M., (2014a). '”Energy Dependence in Developing Countries: Does the Level of 
Income Matter'”, Atlantic Economic Journal, 42(1), pp. 65–77.  
 
Odhiambo, N. M., (2014b). ''Electricity Consumption, Exports And Economic Growth in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo: An ARDL-Bounds Testing Approach'', Journal of 
Developing Areas, 48( 4), pp.189-207.  
 
Oluwatobi, S., Efobi, U.R., Olurinola, O.I., & Alege, P. (2015). “Innovation in Africa: Why 
Institutions Matter”, South African Journal of Economics, 83(3), pp. 390-410. 
 
Osabuohien, E. S., & Efobi, U. R., (2013). “Africa’s money in Africa”, South African Journal 
of Economics, 81(2), pp. 292-306.    
 
Olusegun, O. A., (2008). “Consumption and Economic Growth in Nigeria: A bounds testing 
cointegration approach”, Journal of Economic Theory, 2(4), pp. 118-123. 
 
Ozturk, I., &  Acaravci, A., (2010). “CO2 emissions, energy consumption and economic 
growth in Turkey”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 14(9), pp. 3220-3225.  
 
Roodman, D., (2009a). “A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments”, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 71(1), pp. 135-158.  
 
Roodman, D., (2009b). “How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system 
GMM in Stata”, Stata Journal, 9(1), pp. 86-136.  
 
Shurig, S. (2015). “Who will fund the renewable solution to the energy crisis?”,the guardian, 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-





Tchamyou, V. S., (2017). “The Role of Knowledge Economy in African Business”. Journal 
of the Knowledge Economy, 8(4), pp. 1189-1228. 
 
Tchamyou, V. S., (2019).“The Role of Information Sharing in Modulating the Effect of 
Financial Access on Inequality”. Journal of African Business, 20(3), pp. 317-338.  
 
Tchamyou, V. S., (2020). “Education, Lifelong learning, Inequality and Financial access: 
Evidence from African countries”. Contemporary Social Science. 15(1), pp. 7-25.  
 
Tchamyou, V. A., (2021). “Financial access, governance and the persistence of inequality in 
Africa: Mechanisms and policy instruments”, Journal of Public Affairs: DOI: 
10.1002/pa.2201. 
 
Tchamyou, V. S., & Asongu, S. A., (2017). “Information Sharing and Financial Sector 
Development in Africa”, Journal of African Business, 18(7), pp. 24-49. 
 
Tchamyou, V.S., Erreygers, G., & Cassimon, D., (2019). “Inequality, ICT and Financial 
Access in Africa”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 139(February), pp. 169-
184. 
 
Wei, S.J. (2000), “Natural openness and good governance”, Working Paper, No. 7765, 
NBER, Cambridge, MA. 
 
